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The prosecutor's misuse of scientific evidence to charge and convict 
has not been sufficiently examined. Courts and commentators critiquing 
abuses of scientific evidence in criminal cases rarely focus on the 
prosecutor's role in the process. Issues typically discussed are the 
questionable nature of the evidence, the controversial manner in which 
the evidence was acquired and tested, whether the expert arrived at her 
conclusions in a scientifically reliable manner, and whether the expert's 
courtroom testimony was false or misleading. The prosecutor's control 
over and manipulation of the scientific evidence to shape the fact- 
finder's evaluation of the facts and to persuade the fact-finder of the 
defendant's guilt usually escapes scrutiny. 
One well known exception is the case of Miller v. Pate,' a 
prosecution for the brutal sexual attack and murder of an eight-year-old 
girl. The United States Supreme Court condemned as a violation of due 
process the Illinois prosecutor's conduct in introducing proof and 
arguing to the jury that a pair of men's under-shorts, allegedly worn by 
the defendant and found near the crime scene, were stained with the 
victim's blood. The prosecutor elicited this proof through the testimony 
of a chemist from the State Bureau of Crime Identification, and then 
argued emphatically to the jury: 
Those shorts were found in the Van Buren Flats, with blood. 
What type of blood? Not '0' blood as the defendant has, but 
'A'-type 'A'. . . . And if you will recall, it has never been 
contradicted the blood type of Janice May was blood type 'A' 
positive. Blood type 'A.' Blood type 'A' on these shorts. It 
* Professor of Law, Pace Law School; New York University School of Law, J.D.; 
Princeton University, B.A. 
1 .  386 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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wasn't '0' type as the defendant has. It is 'A' type, what the 
little girl had.2 
However, at a habeas corpus hearing more than ten years later, a 
chemical microanalyst testified that the stains on the shorts were not 
blood, but paint, and that the trial prosecutor, although he knew this, 
consistently and repeatedly misrepresented the shorts as "a garment 
heavily stained with blood."' 
Miller highlights an overarching precept in criminal litigation: the 
prosecutor dominates the system, has exclusive control of the evidence, 
and decides by himself how that evidence will be used.4 If a prosecutor 
uses the evidence responsibly, the verdict is trusted and the public's 
confidence in the adjudicative process is enhanced. If a prosecutor uses 
the evidence irresponsibly, as in Miller, the verdict is suspect, and the 
public's confidence in the adjudicative process is eroded. Clearly, if a 
prosecutor bent on winning at all costs is able to manipulate technical 
and seemingly objective "scientific" evidence, how much more likely is 
it that the prosecutor will be able to misuse more subjective and easily 
manipulated non-scientific evidence such as confessions to police, 
eyewitness identifications, and the testimony of informants, accomplices, 
and jailhouse "snitches?' 
Concern over a prosecutor's misuse of scientific evidence is 
underscored by the recent documentation of wrongful convictions, 
particularly in death penalty cases, and heightened public awareness that 
the justice system errs, often with tragic  result^.^ Many, if not most, of 
2 .  Id. at 4. 
3.  Id. at 6 ("The record of the petitioner's trial reflects the prosecution's consistent 
and repeated misrepresentation that People's Exhibit 3 was, indeed, 'a garment heavily 
stained with blood."'). 
4.  See YALE KAMISAR, ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1 178 (I 0th ed. 2002) 
(describing prosecutor's domination of the criminal justice system, including 
investigative manpower of police, investigative legal authority of grand jury and grand 
jury's subpoena power, early anival on scene by police when evidence is fresh, and 
natural inclination of witnesses to cooperate with police and refuse to cooperate with 
defense). 
5 .  See JIM DWYER, ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000) (providing a compendium of 
anecdotal accounts and legal and social science scholarship of miscarriages of justice in 
American criminal trials); JAMES LIEBMAN, ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR ATES IN 
CAPITAL~ASES, 1973-1995, at 5 (2000) (conducting a massive study of every capital case 
in  the U.S. between 1973-1995 documenting that the overall error rate in capital 
punishment system is sixty-eight percent, and that eighty-two percent of all capital 
judgments reversed on appeal [247 out of 3011 were replaced on retrial with a sentence 
less than death, or no sentence at all); Richard C. Dieter Innocer~ce and the Death 
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these wrongful convictions are attributable to scientific evidence 
presented by prosecutors as trustworthy, and relied on as such by juries, 
when in fact the evidence was erroneous or fra~dulent.~ Prosecutors in 
many of these cases have concealed from the defense evidence that 
would have discredited the prosecutor's case,' distorted evidence by 
eliciting from experts opinions that were either fraudulent or misleading,' 
and subverted the fact-finding process by making arguments to the jury 
that were false, misleading, and inflarnmat~ry.~ 
A prosecutor's courtroom conduct is circumscribed by several legal 
and ethical constraints. A prosecuting attorney occupies two distinct but 
simultaneous roles in the criminal justice system-an adversarial role 
and a quasi-judicial role. A prosecutor in her adversarial role is the 
attorney for the government and may vigorously seek to convict persons 
charged with crimes. A prosecutor in her quasi-judicial role, however, 
has a different mission, namely, a constitutional and ethical duty not 
merely to win a conviction, but also to seek justice.'' The prosecutor's 
role as a "minister of justice" includes preeminently a duty to seek the 
truth." The duty to seek the truth derives from several sources: first, the 
Penalty, Death Penalty Information Center, at http:Nwww.deathpenaltyinfo.org (July 
1997) (listing 107 exonerated inmates released from Death Row since 1973). 
6. See Stanley Feldman, et al., Model Prevention and Remedy of Erroneous 
Convictions Act, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 665,698 (2002) (claiming that forensic evidence that is 
fraudulent or erroneous "has been found to be one of the major causes, and perhaps the 
leading cause, of erroneous convictions of innocent persons."); DWYER ET AL., supra note 
5, at 263 (false and erroneous forensic evidence, including microscopic hair comparisons, 
serology inclusions, and other forensic inclusions, the leading cause of wrongful 
convictions). 
7 .  See infra notes 16-56 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 57-106 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 107-127 and accompanying text. 
10. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("[The prosecutor's] interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done."). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT R. 3.8, cmt. 1 (1993) [hereinafter 
MODEL RULES] ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not 
simply that of an advocate."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L. RESPONSIBlLlTY EC 7- 13 (1 98 1) 
[hereinafter MODEL CODE] ("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of 
the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict."); ABA STANDARDS 
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION 2~ DEF. FUNCTION § 3-1.2(c), The 
Prosecution Function, standard 3-1.2 (c) (Am. Bar Ass'n 3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA 
PROSECUTION STANDARDS] (''The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not rTIerely to 
convict."); NAT.'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, 5 1.1 (2d ed. 1991) ("The primary 
responsibility of prosecution is to see that justice is accomplished."). 
I I .  See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) ("The State's obligation is not to 
convict, but to see that, so far as possible, truth emerges") (Fortas, J., concuning); 
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prosecutor's obligation under due process not to use false evidence or to 
suppress evidence materially favorable to the defendant;12 second, the 
prosecutor's ethical obligation to have confidence in the truth of the 
evidence before bringing criminal charges;13 third, the prosecutor's 
virtual monopoly of the evidence and domination of the fact-finding 
14 
. process; and fourth, the prosecutor's unique power to affect the 
evaluation of the facts by the fact-finder who views the prosecutor as an 
expert who can be trusted to use the facts responsibly.15 
Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Duke, 50 
F.3d 571, 578 n.4 (8th Cir. 1994) (prosecutor has "duty to serve and facilitate the truth- 
finding function of the courts"); Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538, 1548 n.15 (I lth Cir. 1994) 
("prosecutors have a special duty of integrity in their arguments"); United States v. 
Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993) ("lawyers representing the government in 
criminal cases serve truth and justice first"); United States v. Myerson, 18 F.3d 153, 162 
n.10 (2d Cir. 1994) ("the prosecutor has a special duty not to mislead") (quoting United 
States v. Universita, 298 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1962)); Walker v. City of New York, 974 
F.2d 293, 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (prosecutor has "duty not to lie"). See also Bennett L. 
Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 CEO. J .  LEGALETHICS 309 (2001). 
12. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text. 
13. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, at R. 3.8(a) ("The prosecutor is a criminal case 
shall refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor~knows is not supported by 
probable cause"); MODEL CODE, supra note 10, at DR 7-103(A) ("A public prosecutor or 
other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges 
when he or she knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable 
cause."); ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 10, 5 3-3.9(a) ("A prosecutor 
should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of 
criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by 
probable cause."). 
14. See KAMISAR, ET AL., supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
15. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985) ("prosecutor's opinion 
carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the 
Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence"); Berger, 295 U.S. at 
88. 
It is fair to say that the average jury, in a greater or less degree, has confidence 
that these obligations [to serve justice], which so plainly rest upon the prosecut- 
ing attorney, will be faithfully observed. Consequently, improper suggestions, 
insinuations and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry 
much weight against the accused when they should properly carry none. 
Id. 
The prosecutor is cloaked with the authority of the United States Government; 
he stands before the jury as the community's representative. His remarks are 
those, not simply of an advocate, but rather of a federal official duty-bound to 
see that justice is done . . . . [I]t may be difficult for [the jury] to ignore his 
views, however biased and baseless they may in fact be. 
United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1 173, 1178-79 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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The following sections focus on the various ways that prosecutors 
misuse scientific evidence. The opportunity for misconduct is present in 
each of three principal stages of a trial: (1) pre-trial proceedings 
involving disclosure and discovery of scientific evidence, (2) questioning 
scientific forensic experts and introducing into evidence scientific 
exhibits, and (3) closing argument to the jury. 
One of the principal techniques employed by prosecutors to obstruct 
accurate fact-finding is to conceal, or disclose too late for effective use, 
evidence that legally and ethically is required to be dis~losed. '~ The 
prosecutor's suppression of evidence is one of the principal causes of 
wrongful convictions.17 Rules regulating disclosure apply generally to all 
types of evidence. However, disclosure obligations are especially 
important with respect to scientific evidence. Whereas other types of 
evidence such as a defendant's confession, an eyewitness's 
identification, or an accomplice's testimony are familiar modes of proof 
and readily capable of being discredited by a skilled defense attorney, 
scientific evidence, by contrast, is often highly technical and complex, 
even to an experienced defense attorney. Special rules are necessary 
with respect to the scientific data, expert reports, and the expert's 
prospective testimony. Scientific evidence usually requires extensive 
pre-trial investigation, analysis, and testing, typically by an expert hired 
by the defense. Moreover, because of early access to crime scenes and 
superior investigative and forensic resources, prosecutors usually have 
exclusive knowledge and control of the scientific evidence; thus, they 
can determine the extent and timing of disclosure.18 
16. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady 
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 694 (1987) ("[wlhenever a prosecutor 
suppresses exculpatory evidence or presents false evidence, these actions cast doubt on 
the integrity of our legal system and the accuracy of the determinations of guilt and 
17. See LIEBMAN et al., supra note 5, at 5 (noting that prosecutorial suppression of 
evidence accounted for sixteen percent to nineteen percent of reversible errors); Ken 
Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win, 
CHIC. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at 3 (reporting that convictions in 381 homicide cases 
nationwide have been reversed because prosecutors concealed evidence suggesting the 
defendants' innocence or presented evidence they knew to be false). 
18. See KAMISAR, ET AL., supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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Given the complex nature of scientific evidence and the 
acknowledged adversarial imbalance between prosecution and defense,I9 
discovery statutes, as well as ethics rules, require a prosecutor to disclose 
to the defense well in advance of trial test results, reports, and statements 
of scientific forensic experts that the prosecutor intends to use as 
evidence or that are relevant to pre-trial preparation by the defense.20 A 
prosecutor also has a statutory and ethical duty to furnish the defense 
with samples of the scientific evidence to allow the defense to conduct 
independent tests.21 In addition, the prosecutor has an ethical duty to 
comply with these discovery requirements in a timely manner to allow 
sufficient time for pre-trial preparation by the defense.22 Apart from 
discovery that is regulated by statutes, a prosecutor also has a 
constitutional and ethical duty to disclose to the defense favorable 
evidence that is material to guilt,23 or tends to negate guilt.24 
Violations by a prosecutor of these disclosure obligations can result 
in a "trial by ambush."25 Violations include the suppression of scientific 
evidence that the prosecutor believes will, if disclosed, harm his chances 
for a con~ ic t ion ;~~  nondisclosure of evidence that the prosecutor believes 
will, if disclosed, impeach the credibility of his expert;27 and 
nondisclosure or untimely disclosure of scientific evidence that is 
-- 
19. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in 
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L. J. 1 149 ( 1960). 
20. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(D); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY 9 1 1-2. l (iv) (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter ABA DISCOVERY 
STANDARDS]. 
21. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(C); ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 
20, Q: 1 1-2. I (v). 
22. See ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 20, Q: I 1-4. l (a). 
23. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution"). 
24. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, at R. 3.8(d); MODEL CODE, supra note 10, at 
EC 7-13(3); ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 10,Q:3-3.11. 
25. Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 13 17, 1320 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (forensic chemist's 
untimely and incomplete disclosure of critical piece of evidence resulted in "trial by 
ambush"); McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (forensic 
chemist's untimely disclosure of an "incomplete," "inaccurate," and "misleading" report 
resulted in a "trial by ambush"). 
26. See Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457 (1 l t h  Cir. 1986) (ballistics evidence); 
United States ex re/. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952) (ballistics evidence); 
Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964) (ballistics report). 
27. See Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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statutorily and judicially required to be discl~sed.'~ Two cases from 
Oklahoma illustrate the prosecutor's violation of these requirements. In 
Mitchell v. ~ ibson ,~ '  the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated a 
death sentence imposed by an Oklahoma jury, finding that the 
defendant's right to due process was violated by the prosecutor's failure 
to disclose evidence showing that the testimony of the prosecution's 
forensic chemist, Joyce Gilchrist, was false. The victim had been beaten 
and sexually assaulted. Gilchrist, employed by the Oklahoma City 
Police Department, testified that she found sperm on swabs taken from 
the victim that were consistent with the defendant's sperm. She also 
testified that blood, semen, and sperm found on the sheet in which the 
victim's body had been transported from the crime scene were consistent 
with the defendant's, as were semen stains on the victim's panties.'0 
Gilchrist's testimony, according to the federal district judge who 
reviewed the defendant's habeas corpus petition, was "without question, 
untrue."" During the habeas corpus hearing, held more than ten years 
after the trial, the defense learned for the first time about hand-written 
notes taken by Gilchrist during telephone conversations with an FBI 
agent, to whom samples had been sent for further scientific testing. After 
conducting two DNA probes, the FBI agent reported to Gilchrist that 
none of the semen matched the defendant's and further alerted Gilchrist 
that one of her own tests, in fact, excluded the defendant. The prosecutor 
nevertheless concealed from the defense the test results developed by the 
FBI, as well as the notes taken by Gilchrist indicating that the defendant 
had been excluded by the FBI's DNA tests. The prosecutor's "blatant 
withholding of unquestionably exculpatory evidence," according to the 
federal court, is "absolutely indefensible."" Moreover, the prosecutor 
compounded this misconduct by "labor[ing] extensively at trial to 
obscure the true DNA test results and to highlight Gilchrist's test 
The second case involves the prosecution of Jeffrey Pierce, who was 
convicted by an Oklahoma jury in 1986 of rape and sodomy and 
sentenced to fifty-four years in prison." Pierce had a clean record, alibi 
28. See Miller, 809 P.2d at 1317; Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255 (Okla. Crirn. App. 
1990); McCuq, 765 P.2d at 12 15. 
29. 262 F.3d 1036 (10th Cir. 2001). 
30. Id. at 1063. 
3 1 . Id. at 1060. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 1064. 
34. Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1255 (Okla. Crirn. App. 1990). 
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witnesses, and character references. The eyewitness identification by the 
victim was weak." The testimony of the police chemist, again Joyce 
Gilchrist, provided evidence crucial to Pierce's conviction. Gilchrist 
testified that she microscopically identified pubic hairs from the victim's 
pubic hair combings and on the victim's skirt, as well as head hairs on 
items submitted by the victim, and that the hairs were "consistent" with 
Pierce's, and, indeed, "positively" identified him.j6 The prosecutor 
bolstered Gilchrist's testimony by eliciting from her the highly improper 
comment that "in the years during which she had been involved with hair 
analysis, she had never seen hair from different people that were 
microscopically similar in all  characteristic^."^' 
Pierce was innocent, as independent DNA tests conducted by the FBI 
fifteen years later would prove." According to the FBI report, prepared 
following official allegations of misconduct by Gilchrist, the hair 
associations used by Gilchrest to convict Pierce, and the conclusions she 
reached, were erroneous.39 Pierce was released in 2001 after spending 
fifteen years in prison. The decision by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals ten years earlier upholding Pierce's conviction, in retrospect, 
seems sadly misguided. The court rejected several defense claims 
involving disclosure violations by the prosecutor relating to Gilchrist's 
testimony. First, the court found that the prosecutor and Gilchrist 
violated a court order to send the scientific evidence to a laboratory for 
independent testing by defense experts.40 The crucial hair evidence was 
not sent out for testing, Gilchrist claimed, because she did not think the 
laboratory designated by the defense tested hair. This was not the first 
time that Gilchrist had deliberately violated a judge's discovery order.41 
35. Id. at 1258-59. During the investigation, the victim identified two different 
people as looking similar to the attacker. Id. at 1258 n.6. In addition, after a police 
detective showed the victim "better photographs" of other suspects, "she still thought it 
resembled the [other] suspect a lot." Id. at 1259. 
36. Under the Microscope, at http:Nwww.cbsnews.com (July 24, 2002). 
37. Pierce, 786 P.2d at 1265. See also DAVID L. FAIGMAN, ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE 
LAW - FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES 16-1 7 (2002) (by invoking "years of experience," expert 
witness reinforces opinion and prevents effective cross-examination). 
38. Paul Duggan, Oklahoma Reviews 3,000 Convictions; Police Chemist's Work on 
Cuses, Including I I That Led to Executions, Is Questioned, WASH. POST, May 9, 200 1, at 
A2. 
39. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
Sumtnary of Case Reviews of Forensic Chemist, Joyce Gilchrist, Okluhonla City Police 
Luborutory at 3 (April 4, 2001). 
40. Pierce, 786 P.2d at 126 1-62. 
41. See Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 1317 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); McCarty v. State, 
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The discovery violation in Pierce v. State, although clear error, was not 
reversible error, according to the court, because the defense was found to 
be partly to blame for failing to notify the prosecutor when it learned that 
the order had been violated:42 The hair evidence-the most critical 
evidence in the case-was never subjected to independent review. 
Second, Gilchrist's reports on bodily fluids recovered from the 
victim contained only raw data. Her reports did not contain the specific 
conclusions about which she would testify at trial, for example, that the 
rapist belonged to blood group "H" and was a non-secretor, an opinion 
that supported Pier~e."~ In fact, the same Oklahoma appeals court had 
reversed an earlier conviction involving the same allegation, i.e., that 
Gilchrist's report contained insufficient information as to her findings 
and conclusions.44 In reversing that earlier case, the appellate court 
found Gilchrist's report was "at best incomplete, and at worst inaccurate 
and mi~leading."~~ In Pierce, however, the court found that Gilchrist's 
inclusion of the raw data only was adequate compliance with discovery. 
The Court observed, "Although justice is certainly better served when a 
defendant is provided with the most detailed information possible," 
nothing more than was provided in this case should be "judicially 
r eq~ i red . "~~  Given Gilchrist's earlier disclosure violation, however, the 
court's conclusion that the limited amount of information she disclosed 
satisfied the prosecutor's discovery obligation is especially troubling. A 
prosecutor's incomplete, untimely, and total failure to comply with 
discovery obligations is a familiar problem in criminal litigation and is 
one that too often is overlooked by courts. For many prosecutors, the 
modus operandi of pre-trial practice is to disclose as little and as late as 
possible.47 Pierce merely highlights this unfortunate practice in a trial 
that produced a tragic result. 
Related to a prosecutor's constitutional and ethical disclosure duty is 
the duty of a prosecutor to preserve scientific evidence from loss or 
destruction. Clearly, absent an affirmative duty to preserve evidence, the 
- - 
765 P.2d 121 5 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). 
42.  Pierce, 786 P.2d at 126 1 .  
43. See id. 
44. McCarty, 765 P.2d at 12 17- 18. 
45. Id. at 121 8. 
46. Pierce, 786 P.2d at 1262-63. 
47. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperution with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of 
Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 961 (1999) (describing 
practice of prosecutors in limiting compliance with discovery requirements by finding 
safe ways to avoid disclosure). 
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disclosure duty can easily be circumvented by suppression of evidence 
through destruction rather than mere failure to reveal. And given the 
critical role of scientific evidence in exonerating innocent persons, it is 
imperative that prosecutors preserve such evidence, at least for the 
duration of a defendant's in~arceration.~~ Some laboratories apparently 
routinely destroy evidence premat~rely.~~ Whether a remedy exists for 
such routine destruction is unclear. Indeed, because of the speculative 
nature of unpreserved evidence, the United States Supreme Court has 
held that destruction of evidence that might be useful to a defendant 
violates due process only if the defendant can show bad faith on the part 
of the prosecutor or the police.50 Although proving bad faith is extremely 
difficult, it is at least arguable that a laboratory that routinely destroys 
evidence prematurely as a matter of office policy engages in bad faith 
conduct. 
It should be emphasized, if it is not already apparent, that a 
prosecutor is vicariously responsible for the misconduct of other officials 
working on the case. Thus, a prosecutor's disclaimer of responsibility 
for the careless and irresponsible conduct of a forensic laboratory, and 
for the fraudulent and incompetent conduct of his scientific expert, is 
legally unavailing. A prosecutor is constitutionally obligated under due 
process to ascertain whether officials or agents working on the case, such 
as police officers and forensic investigators, have engaged in conduct 
that impairs the integrity of the evidence, or are concealing evidence that 
might be favorable to the defendant.5' Regardless of a prosecutor's legal 
responsibility for the misconduct of his agents, a prosecutor's claim of 
ignorance of the misconduct often is plainly incredible. Documented 
cases of open and notorious misconduct by forensic laboratories and of 
rogue experts giving fraudulent testimony strongly suggest that many 
48. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984) (constitutional duty to 
preserve evidence "limited to evidence that might be expected to play significant role in 
the suspect's defense"). 
49. See Memorandum from Bryon Boshell to Oklahoma City Police Dep't., 
Serology/DNA Concerns, Jan. 16, 2001 [hereinafter Boshell] (describing conditions in 
Oklahoma City Police Department's serology/DNA laboratory and reporting that "rape 
evidence was systematically being destroyed after only two years, long before the statute 
of limitations had expired;" Gilchrist "stated she had a letter from District Attorney Bob 
Macy authorizing two-year destruction;" Gilchrist also stated in an interview that 
"Deputy Chief Wilhelm authorized the two-year destruction policy."). 
50. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,58 (1988). 
51. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-38 (1995); Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150, 154 (1972). 
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prosecutors are fully aware that the laboratory and the expert have been 
engaging in a long-standing practice and pattern of mi~conduct .~~ 
For example, a recent report by the Oklahoma City Police 
Department contains a scathing criticism of the chaotic and dishonest 
work of the Police Department's forensic laboratory over a period of 
many years and particularly, again, the misconduct of G i l ~ h r i s t . ~ ~  The
report describes many instances of missing evidence, flawed operating 
and safety procedures, contamination of evidence, premature destruction 
of evidence, lack of peer review or other validation procedures, storage 
problems, and inadequate procedures for transmitting evidence to and 
from the district attorney's office.54 The report also notes several 
instances of non-disclosure of evidence, improper forensic testimony, 
and criticism of Gilchrist's work by forensic scientific peer 
Given these mostly uncontested allegations of misconduct by 
Gilchrist and the Oklahoma police laboratory that were ongoing for 
many years, and the numerous court decisions expressly critical of 
Gilchrist's work, it is inconceivable that a district attorney's office that 
routinely used and relied on Gilchrist to win convictions was unaware of 
her systematic and pervasive misconduct. Ignorance is never a legal 
excuse when a person deliberately avoids learning about facts and 
circumstances that are readily discoverable because he wishes to remain 
ign~rant. '~ The well-known criminal law doctrine known as "willful 
blindness" should apply equally to a prosecutor who regularly uses a 
scientific expert who is notorious for incompetence and dishonesty. 
Paradoxically, not only were the Oklahoma City prosecutors and police 
not critical of Gilchrist's work, they praised her work. She was awarded 
the Police Department's "Employee of the Year,"" and was given an 
honorary citation by the Police Department and a commendation from 
52. See, e.g., In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d 501, 
503-04 (1993) (investigative report of misconduct in the West Virginia State Police 
Crime Laboratory describes serologist Fred Zain's "long history of falsifying evidence in 
criminal prosecutions," his longstanding "pattern and practice of misconduct," criticism 
of his work by Accreditation Board of the ~merican Society of Crime Laboratory 
Directors, and the fact that "Zain's supervisors may have ignored or concealed 
complaints of his misconduct"). 
53 .  See Boshell, supra note 49. 
54. See id. 
55. See id. 
56. See KAMISAR,  ET AL., supra note 4, at 232. 
57. Under the Microscope, supra note 36. 
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the District Attorney for her "skillful work in the careful analysis of 
forensic evidence" in the Jeffrey Pierce case." 
Finally, nondisclosure, or incomplete or untimely disclosure, is often 
aggravated by the inability of a defendant to challenge effectively the 
scientific evidence that the prosecutor presents to the jury. Imbalance in 
the adversarial process between prosecution and defense is exacerbated 
by an indigent defendant's inability to retain his own scientific expert. A 
responsible commitment to adversarial justice reasonably requires a 
prosecutor to support, or at least not to oppose, an indigent defendant's 
request for expert assistance, particularly when scientific evidence will 
play a significant role in his trial and any resulting error found harmless 
on appeal. Given the speculative and imprecise nature of many types of 
scientific evidence, it is untenable for prosecutors to maintain, as they 
have done, that cross-examination by defense counsel is an adequate 
substitute for a defense expert.59 
A prosecutor's courtroom conduct is hedged by various 
constitutional and ethical proscriptions. A prosecutor is forbidden to 
present false,60 misleading:' inflarnmat~ry:~ or inadmissible evidence.63 
58 .  Id. 
59. See, e.g., Williamson v. State, 812 P.2d 384, 395-96 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). 
But see Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 1999) (denial of expert 
assistance to rebut testimony of Gilchrist regarding hair, fiber, and semen samples did not ' 
result in fundamentally unfair trial). 
60. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (false testimony about promise 
of leniency by key witness); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (false evidence that shorts 
linked to defendant stained with blood); ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note lo,$ 
3-5.6(a) ("prosecutor should not knowingly offer false evidence"). See also B E N N E ~  L. 
GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT $ 10:27 (2d ed. 2002). 
61. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (violation of due process to elicit 
defendant's silence following arrest to infer guilt); United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 
(9th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor falsely suggests that key figure could not be called as 
witness); United States v. Myerson, 18 F.3d 153, 162 n.10 (2d Cir. 1994) ("the prosecutor 
has a special duty not to mislead") (quoting United States v. Universita, 298 F.2d 365, 
367 (2d Cir. 1962). See also GERSHMAN, supra note 60, at 9 10:2 (character 
assassination), $ 10: 13 (misuse of defendant's silence), 9 10:20 (asking questions without 
factual basis), 9 10:21 (misusing polygraph evidence). 
62. See United States v. Garcia, 986 F.2d 1135 (7th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor permits 
containers containing marijuana to remain open and emit odor of mar i j~ana~dur in~  
defendant's case-in-chief despite defendant's request to close them); People v. Blue, 724 
N.E.2d 920 (Ill. 2000) (prosecutor displays before jury on a mannequin the bloodied and 
brain-splattered uniform of murdered police officer); ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, 
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A prosecutor may not mislead the jury or misstate the  fact^.^“ A 
prosecutor may not bolster her witness's credibility.65 These general 
prohibitions apply with added force when a prosecutor presents the 
testimony of a scientific expert because the jury ordinarily views such 
experts with heightened respect and gives considerable weight to their 
opinions. Familiar types of misconduct by prosecutors include eliciting 
fraudulent expert testimony, eliciting erroneous and prejudicial 
conclusions without any factual basis, eliciting testimony that appears to 
be based on a valid scientific theory but is merely the expert's 
speculation and conjecture, attempting to bolster the expert's credibility 
by overstating and misusing the witness's background and experience, 
and giving personal assurances to the jury that the witness is credible and 
reliable.66 
A prosecutor starts with several distinct advantages when she puts 
her scientific expert on the stand. First, in contrast with other types of 
witnesses, the expert usually is viewed by the jury with an "aura of 
special reliability and trustw~rthiness."~~ Second, the expert typically 
possesses impressive credentials, which the prosecutor meticulously 
elicits and that reinforce the jury's confidence in the witness's opinion. 
Third, the expert usually is adept at testifying, and communicates her 
theory and conclusions articulately, persuasively, and in language that 
lay jurors can understand. Fourth, the expert's conclusions almost 
always interlock with other evidence in the case and corroborate the 
prosecution's theory of guilt. The expert, more than any other witness 
supra note 10, 5 3-5.6 (c) ("a prosecutor should not permit any tangible evidence to be 
displayed in the view of the judge or jury which would tend to prejudice fair 
consideration . . . of such evidence"). See also GERSHMAN, supra note 60, at $ 10:33. 
63. See ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 10, $ 3-5.6(b) ("a prosecutor 
should not knowingly . . . offer inadmissible evidence, ask legally objectionable 
questions, or make other impermissible comments or arguments in presence of the judge 
or jury). See also GERSHMAN, supra note 60, at $10: 19. 
64. GERSHMAN, supra note 60, at 5 1 1:27. 
65. Id. at $10:25. 
66. Scientific witnesses typically testify under either of two different standards. 
Under the Frye standard, an expert must be able to establish that the scientific principle 
has "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." See Frye v. 
United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under the Daubert standard, an 
expert must be able to demonstrate that the scientific evidence is reliable, i.e., that the 
reasoning or methodology underlying the expert's testimony is scientifically valid, and 
that the reasoning or methodology properly applies to the facts of the given case. See 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). See also PAUL C. 
GIANNELLI, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE 300-03 (2003). 
67. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1 152 (9th Cir. 1973). 
Heinonline - -  28 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 29 2003 
30 Oklahoma City University Law Review [Vol. 28 
who testifies in a U.S. courtroom, possesses the greatest capacity to 
mislead the jury. In tandem with a prosecutor who zealously seeks a 
conviction, the expert often single-handedly can secure that conviction. 
It is well known that prosecutors, deliberately or unwittingly, have 
introduced fraudulent and erroneous scientific evidence. Such evidence 
has included faked fingerprints planted at the crime scene or placed on 
evidence linked to the faked autopsies in death penalty 
cases:' fabricated breathalyzer readings in intoxicated driving casesJO 
and perjured testimony by experts making hair and blood  comparison^.^' 
Prosecutors have also presented as trustworthy the testimony of scientific 
experts that contained false, exaggerated, and erroneous conclusions that 
lacked any scientific basis. The records of contemporary criminal trials 
are replete with instances of so-called 'tjunk science" finding its way into 
courtrooms, and championed by prosecutors to win  conviction^.^^ Some 
of these scientific experts are infamous: Fred Zain, a se r~ logis t ;~~  Ralph 
Erdmann, a path~logis t ;~~ Michael West, a forensic dentist;75 and Louise 
Robbins, a foot expert.76 Other forensic scientific renegades include 
Joyce G i l ~ h r i s t , ~ ~  Joan Wood, 78Arnold Melnik~ff?~ and Elliot Gross.80 
The relationship between the prosecutor and her expert witness has 
not been adequately studied. Because of the secretive nature of pre-trial 
preparation, the extent to which a prosecutor and her expert cooperate in 
68. See Former State Trooper Explains Ways He Fabricated Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 16, 1993, at B5. 
69. See Robert Suro, Ripples of a Pathologist's Misconduct In Graves and Courts of 
West Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, at 22. 
70. See State v. Gookins, 637 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 1994). 
71. See In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d 501 (W. 
Va. 1993). 
72. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The 
Need for Independent Crime Lrrboratories, 4 VA. J .  SOC. POL'Y & L. 439 (1997) 
(accounts of widespread abuses by forensic scientific experts). 
73. Id. at 442-49. 
74. Id. at 449-53. 
75. Id. at 453-57. 
76. Id. at 457-62. 
77. See supra notes 29-47 and accompanying text. 
78. See A Shocking Blunder Leads to False Accusation, TAMPA TRIB., May 3, 2002, 
at 2. 
79. See Adam Liptak, States to Review Lrrb Work of Expert Who Erred on ID, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at A24. 
80. See Andrew Jacobs & Marc Santora, New Report in Wife's Death Clears Former 
Police Oflcer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002, at Bl. See also Gross v. N. Y. Times Co. et al., 
623 N.E.2d 1 163 (N.Y. 1993). 
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shaping, polishing, and even manufacturing the witness's testimony is 
virtually impossible to p r ~ v e . ~ '  Given the symbiotic nature of the 
relationship, however, it is almost certain that scripting and coaching 
occur. To be sure, ethical rules admonish prosecutors to respect the 
independence of the expert and avoid attempting to manipulate the 
expert's opinion.82 Properly trained forensic scientists are ethically 
required to remain independent and avoid being manipulated to give 
opinions that are not truthful and lack scientific validity.83 It is 
intuitively obvious, however, that the relationship between some 
prosecutors and their experts is mutually reinforcing not in the service of 
truth but of obtaining convictions. According to an influential treatise on 
forensic science, "clients," and this includes prosecutors, "want good 
science and the truth if it will help their case. If good science and the 
truth will not help their case, they will willingly settle for poor science 
and something less than the absolute It is commonly known that 
many forensic experts display a pro-prosecution bias, particularly, but 
not always, by experts employed by law enforcement agen~ies.~'  Many 
of these experts are notorious for manufacturing testimony to fit the 
prosecutor's theory of By the same token, prosecutors routinely 
seek out experts who will support the prosecution's theory and reject 
experts who might display more independence and refuse to provide the 
prosecutor with the opinion he wants.87 According to the former District 
Attorney of Oklahoma County, "An expert who won't give you an 
opinion is not a whole lot of value to 
81. See Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching By Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 829 (2002). 
82. See ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 10, 5 3-3.3 ("a prosecutor should 
respect the independence of the expert and should not seek to dictate the formation of the 
expert's opinion on the subject"). 
83. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 98 (suggesting that normative ideal for 
experts is to present that field's knowledge and not distorted version to serve narrow 
partisan purpose). 
84. Id. at 4. 
85. Giannelli, supra note 72, at 441 ("Too many experts in the criminal justice 
system manifest a police-prosecution bias, a willingness to shade or distort opinions to 
support the state's case."). 
86. Id. (describing the conduct of some of the most infamous so-called "experts"). 
87. Id. at 441, 448 (noting that "too many prosecutors seek out such experts") 
(prosecutors in West Virginia sought out Fred Zain, a serologist widely discredited for his 
long history of falsifying evidence, even after he left the state to obtain a position in 
another state, because West Virginia prosecutors believed that West Virginia serologists 
could not reach the "right" results). 
88. McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 12 19 n. l (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (District 
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Cases abound of prosecutors eliciting erroneous and blatantly 
unscientific opinions. For example, testimony of hair comparisons by 
Arnold Melnikoff, a forensic scientist and former director of Montana's 
state crime laboratory, led to the conviction of Jimmy Ray Bromgard in 
1987 for rape. Bromgard was innocent, cleared by DNA evidence after 
spending fifteen years in jaiLX9 Although hair comparison is recognized 
as one of the most "miserable" types of forensic evidence:' Melnikoff 
testified at Bromgard's trial that head and pubic hairs found at the scene 
of the rape were indistinguishable from those of the defendant. 
Melnikoff testified that the chances that either set of hairs found at the 
scene were not those of the defendant were 1 in 100. He then stated that 
since head and pubic hairs look different, "it's a multiplying effect, it 
would be 1 chance in 10,000."9' Melnikoff's 1 in 100 estimate, as any 
responsible prosecutor and scientist knows, is without any scientific 
basis. Melnikoff's further multiplying of probabilities was so ridiculous, 
and so beyond scientific capabilities, as to suggest that the witness, with 
the prosecutor's acquiescence and assistance, made a conscious effort to 
obtain a conviction based on manufactured testimony. 
Similar examples reveal deliberate attempts by prosecutors to elicit 
opinions that any experienced prosecutor knows are erroneous, 
unscientific, and implausible. One expert, again Gilchrist, in response to 
the prosecutor's question whether she had an opinion as to whether the 
defendant was present during the commission of the crime, gave this 
astonishing reply: "[Hle [defendant] was in fact there."92 
Notwithstanding the notorious weakness of hair comparison evidencey3 
prosecutors have elicited improper opinions that microscopic hair 
Attorney, during interview with newspaper reporter, stated that he wanted experts to give 
opinion that defendant was "actually in fact [at scene of crime] and in contact with the 
victim"). 
89. Adam Liptak, 2 States to Review Lub Work of Expert Who Erred on ID, N.Y. 
TIMES,  Dec. 19, 2002, at A24. 
90. See FAICMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 35. See also infra notes 125-28 and 
accompanying text. 
91. Liptak, supra note 89. 
92. See McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 121 5, 12 18 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (according 
to the appellate court, "We find it inconceivable why Ms. Gilchrist would give such an 
improper opinion"). 
93. See FAICMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 35 ("hair is a miserable form of 
evidence"); DWYER ET AL., supra note 5, at 162 ("the weakness of [hair evidence] is well 
established . . . . [Tlhere was little difference between flipping a coin and getting a hair 
analyst to provide reliable results."). See also infra notes 125-1 28 and accompanying 
text. 
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comparisons from different people "were [never] microscopically similar 
in all  characteristic^,'"^ contained "unique characteristics" that the expert 
had never seen before,g5 and that hair comparisons proved that the 
defendants "were in contact with [the victim] prior to death."96 
Prosecutors have elicited other incredible opinions from reckless and 
irresponsible experts, for example, that a knife blade "indeed and without 
doubt" caused the victim's  wound^,^' and that the odds were 
"astronomical" that another person with the defendant's foot features 
was at the crime scene.98 
Prosecutors compound such unsupportable and implausible opinions 
by various techniques that improperly bolster the expert's credibility. 
One method is to falsely present the expert as a neutral witness when in 
fact the expert has worked closely with the prosecution and manifests an 
unmistakable pro-prosecution bias.99 Another technique is to elicit an 
opinion that validates another witness's truthfulness explicitly,100 or 
suggests that the witness is a member of a class of persons who are 
trustworthy,lOl or asserts that a victim has in fact been victimized.'02 
Another method is to mislead the jury by exaggerating or falsifying the 
expert's credentials.Io3 The prosecutor in Pierce, for example, elicited 
Gilchrist's extensive qualifications, which included membership in the 
influential American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS).Io4 By 
parading before the jury these impressive qualifications, the prosecutor is 
able to reinforce the jury's confidence in the expert's testimony. But 
Gilchrist lied about her credentials, probably with the prosecutor's 
knowledge. Her membership in the AAFS had been suspended. 
Nevertheless, according to the appellate court, Gilchrist's testimony, 
"while potentially misleading, was harmless error in light of her other 
ample qualifications as an expert."'" However, as one commentator has 
94. Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1265 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990). 
95. See Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 13 17, 13 19 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). 
96. Fox v. State, 779 P.2d 562,571 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989). 
97. Giannelli, supra note 72, at 454. 
98. Id. at 459. 
99. See Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003 (6th Cir. 1999) (prosecutor 
violates due process by his "egregious" presentation of expert witness as neutral when in 
reality expert participated actively in investigation of defendant for several years). 
100. See GERSHMAN, supra note 60, at 3 10:32.50. 
101. Seeid. 
102. See id. 
103. See Giannelli, supra note 72, at 468 n.175. 
104. See Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1264 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990). 
105. Id. 
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noted, "If people are willing to lie about something on which it is so easy 
to be caught, how common and how damaging to the fact finding process 
79,106 are misrepresentations about the substance of forensic science. 
Prosecutors use other techniques to bolster their experts' testimony, 
and at the same time insulate that testimony from being challenged 
effectively. One method is to elicit the expert's assertion directly, or to 
prepare the expert's answer to questions on cross-examination, that she is 
relying for her opinion on her "years of experience.'"'' When the expert 
describes a situation as "unusual," "unique," or something that the expert 
"has never seen before," such statements have the capacity to immunize 
the witness against being refuted. The cross-examiner does not know 
what standard the witness is using, what other situations the witness has 
encountered, and whether the witness's assertion is contrived. Clearly, 
when an expert is asked by the prosecutor or defense counsel to explain 
the basis for her opinion, the witness's ability to invoke "years of 
experience" undermines the scientific basis for the opinion and thwarts 
responsible fact-finding.''' 
Prosecutors, assisted by their experts, also inflict so-called 
"evidentiary harpoons" during the evidence process to unfairly prejudice 
the defendant. Evidentiary harpoons are gratuitous remarks by a witness 
that appear to have been deliberately planned to inflict harm. The 
remark may have been prearranged, or it may simply be a voluntary 
remark made by a biased witness "out of the clear blue sky." Expert 
witnesses are adept at inflicting such "harpoons" in response to careless, 
ill-prepared questions by defense counsel on cross-examination. Experts 
also slip such remarks into their direct testimonies. For example, when 
asked by a prosecutor for her opinion with respect to hair comparisons, 
the forensic expert, again Gilchrist, replied that scalp hair fragments from 
an "afro pick" found at the crime scene were microscopically consistent 
106. Michael J. Saks, Prevalence and Impact of Ethical Problems in Forensic Science, 
34 J. FORENSIC S I. 772,789 (1989). 
107. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 16-1 7. 
108. But see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Kumho Tire 
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 
(1997). The Daubert trilogy requires the expert to establish that their reasoning and 
methodology have a scientific basis. Presumably, requiring a valid scientific basis for an 
opinion would prevent an expert witness from utilizing his "years of experience" as the 
basis for his conclusions. However, assuming that the witness is able to establish 
preliminarily some scientific basis for his reasoning and methodology, the witness would 
then have the ability to almost completely confound the cross-examiner by alluding to his 
years of experience in testing and evaluating numerous similar cases. 
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with scalp hairs taken from the same defendant "in another c a ~ e . " ' ~  
Although this answer was a flagrant attempt to implicate the defendant in 
another crime, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found no error. 
According to the court, "it 'stretches the imagination' to suppose the 
witness intended to prejudice the appellant by the uttering one time that 
the hair samples came from another ~ a s e . " " ~  
IV. ARGUMENT TO THE JURY 
Closing argument to the jury is an opportunity for a prosecutor to 
assimilate and distill the proof in an orderly and logical fashion in order 
to persuade the jury of the defendant's guilt beyond any reasonable 
doubt. Closing argument is also an opportunity for a prosecutor bent on 
winning at all costs, as in Miller v. Pate,"' to "strike foul   blow^].""^ 
When courts criticize prosecutors for misconduct, they often are referring 
to the prosecutor's unfair closing argument.'I3 
As with other types of courtroom behavior, a prosecutor's closing 
argument is circumscribed by various constitutional and ethical 
requirements. A prosecutor must not misstate the evidence or mislead 
the jut-y.'I4 A prosecutor must not express her personal belief in the 
truthfulness of her witnesses or the guilt of the defendant.Il5 A 
prosecutor must not make arguments that inflame the passions and 
prejudices of the jury.'I6 Moreover, a prosecutor, more than any other 
lawyer, must be especially careful to avoid misconduct because as a 
prosecutor well knows, her comments carry the imprimatur of the 
government and therefore carry greater weight with a jury that is more 
likely to respect the prosecutor's judgment and have confidence in her 
109. Rogers v. State, 721 P.2d 805, 808 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986). 
1 10. Id. 
I l I .  386 U.S. 1 (1967). 
112. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
1 13. See GERSHMAN, supra note 60, at 3 1 1 : 1. , 
1 14. Id. at 5 l l:27;ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 10, 5 3-5.8(a) 
("prosecutor should not intentionally misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the 
inferences it  may draw"). 
1 15. See GERSHMAN, supra note 60, 5 1 1 :2 1 ; ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra 
note 10, 5 3-5.8(b) ("The prosecutor should not express his or her personal belief or 
opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the 
defendant."). 
1 16. GERSHMAN, supra note 60, 5 1 1:2; ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 
10, 8 305.8(c) ("The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to the 
prejudices of the jury"). 
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assertions."' The prosecutor's standing with the jury may have an even 
greater impact when the prosecutor analyzes the scientific evidence. 
Because such evidence is technical and difficult for lay jurors to 
understand and evaluate, a prosecutor's discussion of such evidence 
provides a powerful opportunity to mislead and prejudice the jury. 
A vivid example of a prosecutor's misconduct during closing 
argument occurred in the notorious "Central Park Jogger" case, in which 
five teenagers were convicted in 1990 of beating and raping a jogger in 
Central Park, New ~ 0 r k . I ' ~  The evidence at trial consisted of videotaped 
confessions by each defendant, corroborated by scientific evidence 
establishing that hairs from the victim were found on one of the suspects. 
The convictions were vacated earlier this year after DNA tests showed 
that the hairs did not come from the victim, and that the defendants' 
confessions were false.lI9 
Apart from the contested confessions, the only items of physical 
evidence offered by the prosecution that directly linked any of the 
teenagers to the crime were four strands of hair attributed to the victim 
and recovered from the clothing of two of the suspects.Iz0 A scientific 
expert testified for the prosecution that the hairs found on the suspects 
were "consistent with" and "similar to" hairs of the v i~ t im. '~ '  However, 
in her closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor used a far different 
characterization of the hair evidence. The prosecutor asserted that the 
hair evidence found on defendant Kevin Richardson's underpants 
"matched the head hair of the victim."'22 The prosecutor further argued 
that a second hair on the defendant's T-shirt "matched' the victim's 
pubic hair.Iz3 The prosecutor then vouched for the reliability of the 
contested confessions by asserting that the defendant "got those hairs 
when he was with" the victim. The prosecutor concluded, "And it was 
because he was touching her, because he came in contact with her and 
117. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
118. See People v. Salaam, 629 N.E.2d 371 (N.Y. 1993); People v. Wise, 612 
N.Y .S.2d 1 17 (N.Y. App. 1994); People v. Richardson, 608 N.Y.S.2d 627 (N.Y. App. 
1994); People v. McCray, 604 N.Y.S.2d 93 (N.Y. App. 1993). 
119. People v. Wise, 752 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002). 
120. Jim Dwyer & Susan Saulny, Hair Evidence in Jogger Case is Discredited, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2002, at B I .  
121. Id. 
122. Id. (emphasis added). 
123. Id. (emphasisadded). 
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with her clothes and when he was on top of her and around her, that's 
how he got her hair on his   lo thing."'^^ 
Clearly, the pressure to win a high profile trial caused this 
experienced prosecutor to make a false and inflammatory argument. 
Experienced prosecutors are aware that microscopic hair comparisons are 
highly subjective and scientifically unreliable. Moreover, in view of 
subsequent published remarks made by her expert, the prosecutor in the 
Central Park Jogger case had to know of the general consensus in the 
scientific community against using the expression that hair "matches," 
and almost certainly was so informed by her expert witness.Iz5 To be 
sure, hair comparisons have produced among the worst results in 
proficiency tests of crime laboratories across the ~ 0 u n t r y . I ~ ~  Hair 
evidence has been a factor in about one-third of the 111 cases of 
wrongful convictions that have been reversed following DNA tests.'27 In 
fact, because hair comparison is so unreliable, some courts have even 
excluded hair comparison testimony entirely, concluding that such 
testimony is unduly speculative, and that the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.Iz8 
Prosecutors nevertheless employ this rnischaracterization when 
arguing to the jury, often without interference by the trial judge. Even 
appellate courts are led astray by the prosecutors' mischaracterizations. 
In Williamson v. state,'" as in the Central Park Jogger case, the expert's 
testimony that hairs were "microscopically consistent" elicited the 
prosecutor's closing argument: "There's a match."'30 Indeed, the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals relied on the prosecutor's 
mischaracterization, stating in its opinion: "Hair evidence placed 
[defendant] at the decedent's apartment."I3' Clearly, if trial and appellate 
124. Id. 
125. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. See also Dwyer & Saulny, supra 
note 120 (Nicholas Petrarca, a scientific expert who testified for the prosecution at the 
"Jogger" trial, stated in a recent interview that "he was often pushed by lawyers to 
declare something was or was not a match, but that he has always resisted such pressure." 
"[Ilit was a strict practice in the police laboratory to avoid declaring a match." "No one 
ever says 'match."'). 
126. See DWYER ET AL., supra note 5, at 62-63. 
127. Id. at 263. See also Dwyer & Saulny, supra note 120. 
128. See Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995); United 
States v. Hutching, No. CR-92-32-S (E.D. Okla. 1993). 
129. 8 12 P.2d 384 (Okla. Crim. App. 199 1). 
130. Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1557. 
13 1 .  Williamson, 8 12 P.2d at 397. See also People v. Richardson, 608 N.Y.S.2d 627, 
628 (N.Y. App. 1994) (court refers implicitly to the forensic hair evidence by stating that 
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courts as well as juries can be misled by a prosecutor's irresponsible 
closing argument, the integrity of the fact-finding process is even further 
compromised. 
V. USING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE RESPONSIBLY 
To protect the integrity of the criminal fact-finding process and the 
accuracy of determinations of guilt and punishment from fraudulent and 
erroneous scientific evidence, courts, legislatures, and prosecutors need 
to focus first on improving the quality and independence of scientific 
forensic laboratories; second, improving the quality and independence of 
scientific forensic experts; and third, improving the ethics and integrity 
of prosecutors in using scientific evidence responsibly in the service of 
truth rather than merely winning convictions. Several scientific forensic 
crime laboratories recently have been discredited for incompetence and 
dishonesty, including the FBI,'32 Ho~ston,"~ West virginia,I3" 
M~ntana,"~ and Oklahoma City.'3"ontributing factors have included 
the absence of quality control procedures, poorly trained and 
unsupervised examiners, no systematic methods for laboratory 
accreditation, no systematic or rigorous blind proficiency testing, and no 
random external scientific audits. In addition, many of these laboratories 
are part of police agencies and invested with a police officer's mindset of 
solving crimes rather than a scientist's mindset of finding the truth. 
Since prosecutors use the resulting evidence to charge and convict, 
and are responsible for the integrity of the proof, they should reasonably 
take the lead in supporting the creation of independent scientific forensic 
laboratories, separated from police agencies and police supervision, 
operated by civilian personnel, with a sufficient budget to provide up-to- 
date facilities for DNA testing, and the capacity to train forensic 
scientists in DNA testing and e~aluat ion. '~~ Such laboratories also 
"there was substantial evidence that defendant was one of the youths responsible for 
nearly killing the victim"). 
132. See David Johnston, Report Criticizes Scientific Testing at F.B.I. Crime Lab, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1997, at A6. 
133. See Nick Madigan, Houston's Troubled DNA Crime Lab Faces Growing 
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,2003, section I at 20. 
134. See In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d 501 
(W. Va. 1993). 
135. See Liptak, supru note 89. 
136. See Boshell, supra note 49  and accompanying text. 
137. See REPORT, GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION  CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, S ATE OF ILL., 
at 5 1-63 (2002); Feldman, supra note 6 ,  at 698-703. 
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should establish quality control procedures to monitor the integrity of 
methods and accuracy of results. 
In addition, as many recent scandals amply show, the quality and 
independence of scientific forensic examiners need to be improved. 
Prosecutors, who rely on these experts as witnesses and who are legally 
responsible for their mistakes and misconduct, again should take the 
lead. Many scientific experts too often think of themselves as police 
officials rather than as  scientist^."^ Even those scientific forensic 
examiners not affiliated with police agencies too often exaggerate or 
misstate their findings in order to support the prosecutor's theory. Some 
of these experts are in a position where they can manufacture evidence, 
and evidence suggests that some of them have done precisely that.'39 
Courts also must be increasingly vigilant to exclude evidence that does 
not have a valid scientific basis and to preclude experts who exaggerate 
the value of their findings.I4O 5 
Finally, proper use of scientific evidence requires above all that 
prosecutors act responsibly in their dual roles as advocates to convict the 
guilty as well as ministers of justice to prevent the wrongful conviction 
of innocent  person^.'^' Sanctions to deter misconduct by prosecutors are 
severely limited. The only realistic sanction faced by a prosecutor who 
commits misconduct is the possibility of the conviction being reversed. 
However, as prosecutors well know, even the possibility of reversal is 
becoming increasingly remote due to the broad availability of 
conviction-preserving doctrines such as the harmless error rule and 
judicial and statutory limitations on habeas corpus review.'42 Personal 
sanctions against a prosecutor for deliberate misconduct, such as civil 
liability and professional discipline, almost never happens.I4' The 
establishment of professional disciplinary commissions solely to oversee 
conduct by prosecutors, much like commissions that review conduct by 
judges, although a viable consideration, is unlikely.'* 
There are other ways to improve the integrity of the fact-finding 
process. Trial and appellate courts should supervise more closely the 
138. See Giannelli supra notes 72, 85-87 and accompanying text. 
139. See Giannelli, supra note 72, at 442-62. 
140. See, e.g., Williamson v .  Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995). 
141. See supra notes 10-1 5 and accompanying text. 
142. See Bennett L. Gershman, The Gate is Open But the Door is Locked-Habeas 
Corpus and Harmless Error, 5 1 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 15 (1 994). 
143. See GERSHMAN, supra note 60, at 55 14: 12 - 14: 13. 
144. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New  prosecutor.^, 53 U .  PIIT. L. REV. 393,453-55 
( 1992). 
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prosecutor's conduct in pre-trial disclosure and discovery. There have 
been extensive reports of serious abuses by prosecutors in concealing 
from the defense favorable material evidence, and in violating discovery 
orders.'45 Nondisclosure of exculpatory and impeachment evidence may 
be the most serious obstacle to the ascertainment of truth in a criminal 
Although statutes typically require timely discovery to the 
defense of scientific evidence, this mandate is easily evaded. 
Information is disclosed that contains insufficient data to assist the 
defense, or arrives too late for effective use.I4' 
Moreover, standards should be established that require prosecutors 
who use scientific evidence, particularly in capital cases, to be trained 
and supervised in their handling of such proof. Standards can be 
established by courts, legislatures, or even within prosecutors' offices by 
establishing protocols for using forensic experts and forensic evidence. 
Prosecutors' offices should develop office policies and incorporate these 
policies into office manuals. 
Standards and protocols should also be established with respect to 
the preservation of scientific evidence. As noted above, too often such 
evidence is routinely de~troyed.'~' In addition, prosecutors should be 
willing to examine post-conviction claims of innocence that might be 
established by DNA evidence.'49 Many prosecutors, by agreeing to new 
tests, demonstrate a commitment to truth and avoidance of a wrongful 
conv i~ t ion . '~~  However, too many prosecutors refuse to allow such tests. 
Courts and legislatures should enact rules requiring post-conviction DNA 
testing if prosecutors demonstrate an unwillingness to consider such 
proof. ' 
145. See, e.g.. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors 
Sacrifice Justice To Win, CHIC. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at 3 (extensive study documenting 
convictions in 381 homicide cases nationwide that were reversed because prosecutors 
concealed evidence of defendants' innocence or knowingly presented false evidence). 
146. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 607,619 (1999). 
147. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
148. See Boshell, supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
149. See Ross E.  Milloy, A Texas Prosecutor Who Seeks Evidence of Innocence, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 2 1,2000, at A9. 
150. See, James Sterngold, Sun Diego District Attorney Offering Free DNA Testing, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2000, at A12. (The New York County District Attorney asked the 
court to vacate the convictions in the Central Park Jogger case after concluding that the 
convictions were based on false confessions.) See also People v. Wise, 752 N.Y.S.2d 837 
(N.Y. Sup. 2002). 
151. See S. Doc. No. 2073, 106th Cong. (2000) (proposed legislation that would 
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Finally, to meet his constitutional and ethical obligations in using 
scientific evidence, a responsible prosecutor should always be guided by 
three precepts.'52 First, a prosecutor should examine the scientific 
evidence with a healthy skepticism developed through education, 
training, and experience. Second, a prosecutor should be willing to 
subject the evidence to rigorous testing and re-e~aminati0n.I~~ Third, a 
prosecutor should have the courage to decline prosecution if he entertains 
a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A prosecutor's use of scientific evidence occurs in every stage of the 
adjudicative process, including pre-trial disclosure and discovery, 
presentation of witnesses and evidence, and closing arguments to the 
jury. A prosecutor's misuse of scientific evidence may violate 
constitutional, statutory, and ethical rules governing the prosecutor's 
conduct. Moreover, given the technical and complex nature of forensic 
evidence, and the prosecutor's standing with the jury, the opportunity for 
a prosecutor bent on winning a conviction to misuse scientific evidence 
is considerable. Abuse occurs when a prosecutor suppresses or discloses 
too late for effective use relevant scientific evidence; elicits testimony 
from her scientific forensic expert that is fraudulent or erroneous; or 
improperly bolsters that testimony; or makes arguments to the jury that 
are false, misleading, or inflammatory. 
Improving the integrity of scientific evidence requires establishing 
scientific forensic laboratories that are independent of law enforcement 
agencies and that maintain rigorous quality control procedures; 
improving the training and supervision of the experts who examine the 
evidence and testify in court; and requiring training, supervision, and 
protocols for prosecutors in the use of scientific evidence to ensure that 
the integrity of the fact-finding process is not tainted by fraudulent or 
erroneous scientific proof. 
mandate free DNA testing on application of convicted defendant o f  any biological 
material in government's possession related to the prosecution). 
152. See Gershman, supra note I I ,  at 342-5 1.  
153. See Andrew Jacobs & Marc Santora, New Report in Wife's Death Clears Former 
Police OfJicer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002, at B1 (prosecutor dismisses murder charges 
that were based initially on pathologist's erroneous conclusion after independent experts 
demonstrated that death was caused accidentally). 
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